b. Three Other Objections

α. Exposition of the Objections

248. But there is still argument against this [n.238], that when some quality is in a subject, it can be the principle of acting toward something incompossible with the substantial form; therefore it can be here too [sc. in the Eucharist], because it was stated before [cf. n.186] that every alteration that an accident in a subject can cause it can cause without a subject.

249. Again, secondly, every degree of quality is of the same idea; therefore, what can have an action corruptive of one degree, that thing, belonging to the same idea, can, if it is more perfect, be the principle of action corruptive of a further degree, and so on about any degree. But it is possible for a separated quality to corrupt some degree of quality of a substance, as you concede [n.247];     therefore , if another separated quality be superior, it can corrupt any degree of the quality. But when every degree whatever of quality is corrupted, the prior substance does not remain because, without its natural quality, it does not remain; therefore etc     .

250. Again, thirdly, a natural agent could corrupt the qualities in the Eucharist, and so consequently it could induce some degree incompossible with those forms [sc. qualities] in their species; and yet it cannot induce some substantial form there, because there is no subject there; therefore, by parity of reasoning, separated qualities could induce in a passive object a degree incompossible with the quality [of that passive object], albeit they could not induce any substantial form concomitant with the opposite quality.

β. Solution to the First Objection

251. To the first [n.248] I say that an active quality existing in a substance cannot be per se the active principle with respect to some quality repugnant to the substance to be corrupted; but it can only be the principle of causing some quality in the sort of degree on which follows the corruption of the substance possessing that quality. But there [sc. when a quality exists in a substance] the corruption of the corruptingTreating the Latin ‘corrumpentis’ as intransitive and as meaning ‘undergoing corruption’. Otherwise the text seems hard to make sense of. ⁴⁸ substance follows this degree of the quality, while here [sc. in the Eucharist] it does not. For some agent conjoined with the accident is there that can corrupt this substance and generate another; while here whatever precedes the corruption of the substance would very well be induced, but on it the corruption of the substance by that agent does not follow, but rather by some universal agent, as was said above [n.247].

γ. Solution to the Second Objection

252. To the second [n.249] I say that, although this degree and that be of the same idea in themselves, yet not in comparison with any agent at all, because an agent that can corrupt a substance can corrupt the ultimate degree of the quality consequent to that substance, and only that agent can do so. But another agent can well corrupt other degrees not necessary to that substance.

253. Or one can say differently, and more plainly, that degrees can be of the same idea either in themselves alone or in themselves and in relation to a subject.

254. If in the first way [n.253], the proposition is false that says an agent of the same idea can corrupt things that are of the same idea [n.249]; for if these things are not of the same idea in relation to the subject (for instance because the subject determines one of them for itself but does not necessarily determine the others for itself), some agent can well corrupt one degree in such subject and yet not be able to corrupt the ultimate degree, because this latter is only corrupted with the corruption of the substance.

255. And if you make this argument, that just as substance necessarily requires the degree of the quality consequent to it, so that degree is repugnant to a contrary agent; therefore, just as you say the degree will remain as long as the subject remains [n.252], so it follows that, because of an active contrary, it do not remain.

256. And besides, what is posterior in generation is prior in corruption; but the quality (according to the degree necessary for the substance) is posterior in generation to the substance;     therefore , it will be prior in corruption. Therefore , it will be naturally corrupted before the substance is, and only by the altering cause as it is altering cause; therefore etc     .

257. To the first point [n.255] I say that if the contrary agent were as potent in destroying that degree as the substance is in conserving it, then the argument would have evidence on its side; but I say the substance has greater virtue for resisting the contrary corruptive of that degree than the contrary has active virtue for corrupting it. And the reason for this is that, by comparing active agent to active agent, the one simply more perfect in entity is simply more perfect in virtue; but substance has active virtue with respect to the quality that is consequent to it, and the contrary quality has an active virtue for corrupting it. But substance is simply more perfect than the contrary quality; therefore, the virtue of the substance is simply greater in resisting. And from this the probability is good that the substance is the active cause with respect to the quality consequent to it, because otherwise it would not resist the contrary corrupting its quality, nor would that quality be able to resist, because it is of itself something more imperfect than the corrupting contrary, were it posited, is more intense in its species than the quality is in its.

258. To the second [n.256] I say that that proposition [sc. ‘what is posterior in generation is prior in corruption’] is only true of things that are ordered in a generation and corruption pertaining to the same genus, of which sort are ordered forms (according to those who posit many forms); for as there the more universal form comes first to the matter, so it departs last. But as to substance and proper quality (which is consequent to the substance in the degree to which it is necessary for the substance), the proposition is false; rather, the quality is both induced later and corrupted later.

259. And if you ask, ‘by what is this sort of quality induced, whether by the generator as generator or by the alterer as alterer?’, and if you ask similarly, ‘by what is it corrupted, whether by what is corrupting the substance as it is corrupting it or by the alterer as it is inducing an opposite quality in what has been generated?’ - I reply: the proximate effect of a cause equivocal in species is caused in any individual by an individual of the equivocal cause. The reason is that individuals of the same species do not necessarily require causes different in species; for it is possible for the same specific nature in this individual to be produced by a cause of the same idea as that by which the same nature is caused in another individual; because the same inducing formal principle is sufficient for the same formal term; and that which, here and there, has the same formal term does not necessarily require a productive cause of a different idea,

260. From this proved proposition [n.259] about equivocal cause and proximate effect, I conclude that a quality necessarily consequent to a substance according to its species is caused in any substance by a substance of that sort; because the first quality is only caused by a substance; therefore any quality can be caused by it as well. And consequently, since an equivocal cause has more virtue than a univocal cause, then, if the univocal cause could induce the effect, the equivocal cause would still precede it, as the Philosopher says about a big flame and a little flame, On Respiration 4.469b31-70a5. The quality, therefore, of a generated thing is not induced by any alterer as it is alterer; that is, a quality is not the formal principle of inducing the quality.

261. And if you argue that then the previous alteration does not have a term - this is not unacceptable about a term per se of the same genus, because it has an extrinsic term, the substantial form of the generated thing.

262. And if you ask whether the quality of the generated thing is induced by the substance that generates it, I say that, although it could be induced by that substance, yet more probably it is induced by the generated substance itself, because though agents that have the same and equal virtue could induce the same form in the same passive thing, yet the generator or agent has the passive thing the more immediately conjoined to it the more it acts more efficaciously than the other equal things. But if it is the passive susceptive thing of the term of its action, as in the issue at hand, it is a passive thing more immediately conjoined to itself, and consequently the generator there will not precede the generated substance, because it is not prior to itself in perfection but only in duration. Now the generated thing is equal in perfection to, and more immediate than, itself as passive, and this can well preserve how such inducible equivocal forms are induced by whatever is in the generated thing itself; but such an equivocal agent would not be said to be able to induce the form in another passive thing (just as one will cannot induce volition in another will, yet it can well induce volition in itself).

263. From this is plain what the preceding quality is corrupted by, because it is corrupted by that by which the quality proper to the generated thing is induced, as was said [n.262]. Or one can say better that it is corrupted by that which corrupts its subject; but this is the thing that is generating the contrary substance - and then the quality of the corrupted thing is not corrupted save per accidens. However, the generated thing’s induced quality, which has some degree that was simply incompossible with the substance to be corrupted, is itself induced per se by the action of the generated substance, although not by a change, because the subject did not previously exist lacking that quality.

264. Now these things which have been said are not only true of an accident separated from substance, but also of an accident existing in a substance, because there the substance as possessed of quality does not induce a degree of it compossibleThe text says ‘compossible’ but a variant reads ‘incompossible’, which latter may be right. ⁴⁹ with the substance to be corrupted; but as a substance it corrupts a substance and consequently corrupts its quality; and as substance it generates substance; and the further degree proper to the substance to be generated, which was previously incompossible with the substance to be corrupted, is from the generated thing itself.

265. Hence is manifestly clear the falsity of this proposition, ‘every substance is corrupted for this reason, that some degree is induced that is incompossible with its own proper quality’; rather, never is a degree incompossible save in some substance already generated, otherwise the incompossibles would exist together. Nor can any degree induced or inducible by an alterer, as it is alterer, corrupt a substance, because nothing posterior in genus can be the cause of corrupting something prior in genus.

266. From this is plain the answer to the objection that can be made about water which could not corrupt fire [cf. n.243], because the fire simply has a nobler and more perfect active virtue. - I reply: it is not said that a more imperfect thing cannot corrupt a more perfect one [cf. n.245] (speaking of species compared to species), but that an active thing more imperfect in genus cannot corrupt a being more perfect in genus (because it can only induce something more imperfect in genus, and this more imperfect something cannot be successor to the corruption of a thing more perfect in genus). Now an accident cannot be properly successor to the corruption of a substance, because if it alone were to succeed to it, the substance as substance would be quasi annihilated. But an imperfect thing of the same genus is not so, because a more imperfect thing (in that it can induce something like itself) can induce something that can succeed to the corrupted thing of the same genus.

267. One could also say that between a perfect and imperfect thing of the same genus there is a formal repugnance, on account of which the one can corrupt the other; but between a perfect thing of one genus and an imperfect thing of another genus there is no repugnance save only a virtual one, the way the prior is repugnant to the opposite of the posterior, and the posterior to the opposite of the prior. Now the posterior in genus has only power per se for the opposite of its genus, and therefore not for the corruption of the prior in genus, to which it is not opposed save indirectly.

δ. Solution to the Third Objection

268. As to the third [n.250], I concede that the separated species could be corrupted by a created agent, as will be stated in the following article [nn.432-437], and as will also be stated in what way a substance there may be generated or not generated [nn.490-499].

269. But if the argument be formed in this way: ‘once separated accidents are posited, as the heat of fire in a quantity, not only the most perfect degree of the heat but even the ultimate degree could be corrupted by a substance altering it, or by some other separated quality, by a contrary or more active thing, as a separated quantum of cold. But this separated coldness is not of greater virtue or more active by the fact the heat is separated than if the heat were in a substance as in a subject; therefore if the heat were in the substance of fire, the separated cold could still corrupt the ultimate degree of the substance of fire; and then the whole main argument stands [n.250], that the heat cannot be corrupted unless the substance of the fire be corrupted, nor can it be corrupted unless another substance be generated, and so the separated cold could generate a substance’ - I reply that, by positing the heat of fire and the cold of water in separated quantities, if the coldness, in accord with intensity in its own species, were simply to overcome the heat in its species, I concede that any degree, even the ultimate degree, of the heat could be corrupted by the cold; but it does not follow that likewise the ultimate degree of heat could be corrupted when the heat is in fire.

270. The reason is this, that the quantity that is the subject of the separated heat does not determine for itself necessarily a degree of heat that is no more the lowest than the highest; for it does not have an active virtue or a necessity with respect to any degree there at all; and therefore what can corrupt one degree in such a subject can corrupt this degree and that degree and any degree you like.

271. Hence these degrees are of the same idea in themselves and in comparison with the subject, and the subject has an equal determination or lack of determination for any degree at all, and conversely; but it is not so when the heat is in the fire; for fire does not determine for itself necessarily the supreme degree, but the degree is in the fire contingently, and therefore if that degree could not resist the cold corrupting it, the subject will not resist it either, because it does not necessarily require that degree, but determines the lowest degree for itself. And therefore, although the lowest degree could not resist the corrupting contrary, yet the substance of fire, which is of greater virtue, can resist the corrupting contrary; for the substance of fire has more power for preserving the effect than the cold has for corrupting it. The substance will therefore preserve that degree as long as the fire is remaining in its being; and therefore, unless there is something corrupting the fire in itself, the degree will not be corrupted.

272. When, therefore, it is said [n.269] that the cold is not of greater virtue or more active by the fact that the heat is without a substance than if the heat were in a substance - I concede that in itself the cold is not more active, but it can act more on the contrary, because this separated contrary lacks a cause preserving its being, but when it is conjoined [sc. with a substance] it does have a cause preserving its being.

273. And this reason [n.272] is universal about contrary causes formally or virtually coming together on the same passive object; for one cause is not simply more or less active than the other because it comes together with it on the same passive object; but yet one acts less on this object by the fact that the other comes together with it, for the other impedes it.